According to the recent rulings of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), TV white spaces (TVWS) can now be accessed by secondary users (SUs) after a list of vacant TV channels is obtained via a geo-location database. Proper business models are therefore essential for database operators to manage geo-location databases. Database access can be simultaneously priced under two different schemes: the registration scheme and the service plan scheme. In the registration scheme, the database reserves part of the TV bandwidth for registered White Space Devices (WSDs). In the service plan scheme, the WSDs are charged according to their queries.
I. Introduction
R ECENTLY, the FCC has released the TVWS for secondary access [1] under a database-assisted architecture, where there are several geo-location databases providing spectrum availability of the TV channels. These databases will be managed by database operators (DOs) approved by the FCC. To manage the operation costs, proper business models are essential for DOs.
The FCC allows DOs to determine their own pricing schemes [1] and there are two different ways in which SUs can assess the TVWS with the help of a database. SUs can register their WSDs in the database in a soft-licence style [2] . Part of the available TV spectrum is then reserved for the registered SUs [3] [4] . Unregistered SUs can also access TVWS in a purely secondary manner. For instance, an SU can first connect to the database and upload WSD information such as location and transmission power and then obtain a list of available channels from the database.
As a result, two different pricing schemes can be employed, one for registered and the other for unregistered SUs, respectively. Registered SUs pay a registration fee to DOs and access Manuscript received January 20, 2013; revised July 30, 2013 and January 22, 2014; accepted January 23, 2014. The associate editor coordinating the review of this paper and approving it for publication was B. Liang.
X. Feng the reserved bandwidth exclusively. This pricing scheme can be referred to as the registration scheme. Unregistered SUs query the database only when they are in need of TV spectrum. DOs charge them according to the number of database queries they make. This pricing scheme is referred to as the service plan scheme. The co-existence of multiple pricing channels allows DOs to better manage their costs and provides different service qualities to different types of SUs. For example, the registration scheme can be adopted by SUs providing rural broadband or smart metering services, since the reserved bandwidth may suffer from less severe interference. On the other hand, the service plan scheme suits the temporary utilization of TVWS such as home networking.
To harvest the advantages of both pricing schemes and maximize the profit of DOs, two challenges need to be addressed. First, how should DOs determine pricing parameters for each scheme? With limited available TV bandwidth, DOs need to decide how much to allocate to each pricing channel. Also, the registration fee in the registration scheme and the price for a certain amount of queries should be determined. Second, how should SUs choose between the two schemes? Both schemes have their pros and cons for different types of SUs. The two challenges are coupled together. The decisions of SUs on which pricing scheme to choose can affect the profit obtained by DOs while the pricing parameters designed by DOs ensure SUs have different preferences for either scheme.
In this paper, we focus on DO's hybrid pricing scheme design considering both the registration and the service plan scheme. To the best of our knowledge, there are no existing works on geo-location database considering a hybrid pricing model [10] - [12] . We consider one DO and multiple types of SUs. The SUs can strategically choose between the two pricing schemes. Unlike many existing works consider no SU strategies when there exist multiple pricing schemes, in this paper, we assume users can have their own choices other than being directly classified into either pricing scheme. We argue that especially for a new service like database-based networking, users will consider seriously of the benefits from each scheme and other players' responses.
In this paper, we consider a two-stage pricing framework. At Stage I, the DO announces the amount of bandwidth to be reserved and the registration fee for the registered SUs and then the SUs choose whether to register or not. At Stage II, the DO announces a set of service plans for the unregistered SUs to choose from.
For the SUs, they decide which pricing scheme to choose given the announced pricing schemes. If the service plan scheme is adopted, SUs should further decide one particular plan to buy. In this paper, we consider two different SU scenarios. In the non-strategic case, SUs have fixed their pricing scheme choices. In the strategic case, SUs can compete with each other in choosing either pricing schemes. In the later case, the competition among the SUs is modeled with the noncooperative game theory since the choices of the other SUs can affect an SU's utility owing to the sharing of TVWS.
For the DO, the problem is to optimally allocate bandwidth and design pricing parameters based on estimated actions of the SUs. In this paper, we consider the DO has either complete or incomplete information of the SUs. By complete information, we mean that the DO knows the exact type of each SU. The type of SU relates with its channel quality, valuation for the spectrum et al. In the case of incomplete information, the DO knows only a distribution of the types. We model the optimal service plan design problem with contract theory. Different service plans are considered to be different contract items and an optimal contract is determined based on the knowledge of the SU types. To optimally choose pricing parameters, one challenge to tackle is how the DO estimate the possible actions of the SUs, especially for the strategic case. There may be multiple possible equilibriums existed in the game. We solve this challenge by exploring the nature of our problem and propose computationally feasible algorithm to estimate the outcome of the game.
The major contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose a hybrid pricing scheme for the DO considering the heterogeneity of SUs' types. As far as we know, it is the first work considering hybrid pricing schemes for TVWS database. • We model the competition among the strategic SUs as a non-cooperative game. We prove the existence of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) under both the complete and incomplete information cases. By exploring the nature of the problem, we design computational feasible distributed algorithms for the SUs to achieve an NE with bounded iterations. • We propose algorithms for the DO to optimally decide pricing parameters. We formulate the service plan design with contract theory and derive optimal contract items under the complete information and sub-optimal items for and incomplete information scenario. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the pricing framework and detailed system model. Problem formulation is presented in Section III. In Section IV we study the optimal pricing solution for non-strategic SUs under the complete information scenario as a baseline case. Then in Section V and Section VI, we consider the SUs to be strategic players, under complete and incomplete information scenario, respectively. Numerical results are given in Section VII. Related works are further reviewed in Section IX. Finally, Section X concludes the paper.
II. System Model and Pricing Framework
In this section, after an overview of the system parameters, we introduce the big picture of the proposed pricing framework. Then we further detail the model for the DO and the SUs, respectively. Key notations are summarized in Table I . The secondary user with index i θ i
The type of u i B
The expected bandwidth of available TVWS B R The expected bandwidth reserved for registered SUs r
The registration fee q i
The number of database queries in a query plan (q i , p i ) p i
The wholesale price in the query plan (q i , p i ) T
The number of different SUs' types θ i
The i'th smallest user type β i
The percentage of SUs with type θ i γ i
The percentage of SUs with type θ i with registration scheme
A. System Parameters
We consider the scenario with one DO and N SUs denoted as N = {u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u N }. We assume N is public information available to the DO and the SUs. For the ease of analysis, we assume all the SUs are in the same contention domain. FCC requires the SUs to periodically access the database [1] . In this paper, we consider a time duration of M periods. In each period, before accessing the TV channels, the SUs should connect to the database to obtain a list of available channels. We assume the total available TV channels in each period have an expected bandwidth of B and the bandwidth of a channel is b 0 . The number of available channels is then B/b 0 .
B. Pricing Framework
The DO offers two different pricing schemes, the registration scheme and the service plan scheme, simultaneously.
In the registration scheme, the SUs are registered with a uniform registration fee r. The DO reserves a fraction of B R /B (0 ≤ B R ≤ B) of the total TV bandwidth for them in each period. The expected number of reserved channels is B R /b 0 . The DO further divides the reserved channels equally to serve each registered SU. To make the problem solvable, in this paper, we consider only uniform registration fee. In a more flexible setting, the registered SUs can pay different amount of registration fees and enjoy different shares of the reserved bandwidth. We also assume an SU can refuse to pay the registration fee to abort the deal.
In the service plan scheme, the DO offers the SUs several query plans, which are a set of K +1 query-price combinations denoted as P = {(q i , p i ), i = 0, 1, · · · , K}. During the M periods, the SUs with chosen plan (q i , p i ) can access the database q i times with a wholesale price p i . Note that q i s are integers and 0 ≤ q i ≤ M. We assume there is a plan (q 0 = 0, p 0 = 0) for SUs choosing neither scheme. The unregistered SUs shared the unreserved band in a time division manner. For example, these SUs can leverage CSMA in the MAC layer for channel access as today's Wi-Fi.
The pricing procedure is conducted at the beginning of the M periods and can be viewed as two stages. At stage I, the DO announces parameters B R and r for the registration scheme. Then the SUs decide whether to register. At stage II, the DO first announces P for all unregistered SUs and then these SUs specify which particular query plan to buy. An SU can always choose (q 0 , p 0 ) to abort the deal.
C. DO Model
We assume the DO has two different sources of database maintenance cost. On one hand, to reserve bandwidth for the registered SUs, DO needs to pay a bandwidth reservation fee to the regulators. We assume the cost to reserve b MHz bandwidth is in the form φ 0 (b) = 0 ·b α , α ≥ 1. The reservation cost is a convex function on b. The key reason is that spectrum bandwidth is a limited resource. Reservation must be approved by the regulator and there can be multiple databases trying to reserve bandwidth. When the total demand is higher, the equilibrium price can be also higher [18] . Furthermore, to avoid unnecessary reservations, the regulator may consider charge higher for more reserved bandwidth [4] . On the other hand, there is also the cost for the DO to calculate the available bandwidth and respond to the queries of unregistered SUs. Here we adopt a linear cost function on the query number. We assume forueries, the DO has to pay a marginal maintenance cost φ 1 (q) = 1 · q.
We define the utility of the DO, denoted by U DO as the difference between the payment received from all the SUs and the total cost. For convenience, we assume the number of SUs choosing query plan i is N i , (i = 0, 1, · · · , K), the number of registered SUs is μ 0 and the number of unregistered users is μ 1 then
D. SU Model
According to the pricing framework, the SUs choosing the same pricing scheme share the spectrum evenly. For u i , if there are X SUs sharing the same bandwidth of W, its capacity is given by the Shannon-Hartley theorem as: C i (X, W) = 1 X · W log 2 1 + S i n 0 , where S i is the average received signal power over bandwidth W at u i 's receiver, n 0 is the average noise and interference power over the bandwidth. S i relates to the transmission power of u i and the path loss between u i 's transmitter and receiver. Without loss of generality, we assume n 0 is identical for all SUs.
We assume SUs have linear valuations for any expected capacity they achieve. We define the valuation function of u i as:
where w i is the valuation parameter of u i . w i > 0 and its physical meaning is that the valuation of the unit channel capacity contributes to the overall benefit. w i relates to the personal information of u i such as the possible transmission duration in each period.
We define the utility of u i , denoted as U i , as the difference between its valuation of the guaranteed capacity and the price charged by the DO. If u i chooses the registration scheme, it can occupy part of the TV bandwidth by itself. Its utility is
If u i chooses the service plan scheme, it should share the bandwidth with other unregistered SUs. There are at most μ 1 unregistered SUs sharing, any one of them is guaranteed with a valuation of V i (μ 1 , B−B R ) in one access. Moreover, u i can only access at most q j periods after selecting query plan (q j , p j ). Therefore, its utility is
M q as the valuation ofueries. The physical meaning of θ i is the capacity of u i that can turn unit bandwidth into revenue. We use a i to denote the pricing scheme selected by u i . a i = 0 (a i = 1) represents the registration (service plan) scheme. The utility function of u i can be summarized as
We assume there are a total of T different types and we denote the types by the set Θ = {θ 1 , θ 2 , · · · , θ T }. Without loss of generality, we assume 0 < θ 1 < θ 2 < · · · < θ T .
III. Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the pricing problem according to the two-stage pricing framework.
A. SU Strategy
In this paper, we consider two different cases of SUs based on their abilities to act strategically.
• Non-strategic SUs: for u i , a i is fixed before the pricing procedure. An SU will not change the choice of the pricing scheme strategically according to the choices of other users. • Strategic SUs: for u i , a i is not pre-fixed. u i can determine its pricing scheme dynamically according to the choices of other SUs. In the case of non-strategic SUs, we assume the fraction of SUs with type θ i choosing a i = 0 is γ i (i = 1, · · · , T ). And we assume the ratio of SUs of type θ i among all SUs is β i . Therefore, the total number of SUs with a i = 0 is N T i=1 β i γ i and the total number of SUs with
In the case of strategic SUs, at stage I, given B R and r, the SUs compete for pricing schemes. The interactions among the SUs form a Non-cooperative Database Registration Game
where N is the set of players, S is the set of strategies, and U i is the payoff function of play u i . Let a = (a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a N ) be the strategytuple of all the SUs. Let a −i = (a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a i−1 , a i+1 , · · · , a N ) be the strategy-tuple of all the SUs expect u i .
B. Information Scenario
In this paper, we also study the following two different information scenarios.
• Complete information: in this case, the DO and the SUs are perfectly informed about the type of each SU. • Incomplete information: in this case, the DO and the SUs know only the distribution of the SUs' types. In the complete information scenario, the DO can treat each SU separately and offer a type-specific contract item. However, in the incomplete information scenario, the DO cannot observe the type of each SU, it has to offer the same set of query plans to all SUs.
To tackle the two different information scenarios, we model the design of query plans with contract theory [6] . The buyers' types are their private information. According to the revelation principle [6] [7] , it is sufficient to design at most T contract items, one for each type of the SUs. Therefore, we assume K = T and an unregistered SU of type θ i will eventually choose plan (q i , p i ).
C. Backward Induction for the Two-stage Pricing Framework
Based on the two-stage pricing procedure, the design of the optimal pricing schemes can be analyzed with backward induction. More specifically, we first show how should the DO design the query plans for the SUs at stage II, given B R , r and SUs' strategy-tuple a. Then we study how the SUs choose the pricing scheme given B R , r announced at stage I. Finally, based on the knowledge of the possible pricing scheme selection of the SUs, the DO optimally selects B R and r at stage I.
In this paper, we will first consider a baseline scenario where SUs are non-strategic players and the DO processes complete information of all the SUs. Then, we extend our analysis to strategic SUs under both complete and incomplete information scenarios.
IV. Pricing Solution for Non-strategic SUs in Complete
Information Scenario
In this section, we consider a baseline case where the SUs are non-strategic players and the DO has complete information of all the SUs.
A. SU Behavior Given Pricing Parameters
Since the SUs fix their choices of pricing schemes, we can analyze the registered and unregistered SUs separately.
At stage I, some SUs with a i = 0 may refuse to pay the fee if it is too high for them. Given B R and r, u i pays the registration fee if and only if the following condition holds:
is the prior knowledge of the number of registered SUs. Non-strategic SUs decide whether to pay the fee only based on the prior knowledge. The actual number of registered SUs can be calculated as
At stage II, there are
The constraints are usually referred to as the Individual Rationality (IR). The following lemma says that all the IR constraints are bind under complete information.
Lemma 1.
At stage II, if the DO has complete information of θ i for each u i , the optimal query plan (q i , p i ) offered to u i satisfies:
Proof: Please refer to [19] .
B. Optimal Parameter Selection of DO
By substituting (3) and (4) into (1) we can rewrite U DO as
Optimizing U DO defined by Equ. (5) is a non-convex optimization problem and there is no closed-form solution. Solving this problem can be NP-hard [19] . Considering the nature of our problem, the physical meaning of B R is the bandwidth reserved for registered SUs and B R is measured in channels. The possible values of B R /b 0 are integers in the range [0, B/b 0 ]. Also, we observe that U DO has a linear relationship for all {q i }, then q i will either be 0 or M.
Furthermore, the range and scale of the registration price r are also limited in reality. If we also restrict the range of r to be [r ,r] and its minimum scale to be r 0 , the DO needs only to explore a total of B B R ·¯r −r r 0 combinations to find the solution. In this paper, we will leverage this simpler but efficient twodimensional search method to find the pricing parameters.
Therefore DO tries to solve the following optimization problem 
We provide the numerical results in Section VII.
V. Pricing Solution for Strategic SUs in Complete Information Scenario
In this section, we consider the SUs to be strategic players.
A. Stage II: Optimal Contract Design under Complete Information
Same as the case discussed in Section IV, when the DO processes complete information of the SUs, any SU choosing the service plan scheme will have zero utility. The contract items (q i , p i ) satisfy the condition in Eqn. 
We show that the NDRG under complete information is a Unweighted Congestion Game [8] .
Lemma 2. NDRG under complete information is an unweighted congestion game. Algorithm 1 Distributed Database Registration Algorithm.
if i M = 0 then BREAK out of WHILE; 5: end while 6 : a i = 0, ∀θ i > θ i M ; 7: for i ∈ {1, · · · , N} do 8: if θ i = θ i M and B R θ i > (R + 1) · r then 9: R = R + 1; a i = 0; 10: end if 11: end for Proof: Please refer to [19] . The nice properties of the unweighted congestion game are summarized as lemma [8] .
Lemma 3. Every unweighted congestion game possesses an NE. From an arbitrary strategy-tuple a, there exists a bestreply improvement path [8] within s n+1 2 steps, where s is the number of all strategies and n is the number of players.
2) Distributed Database Registration Algorithm: Lemma 3 confirms the existence of an NE in the NDRG under complete information. Starting from any strategy-tuple, an NE can be achieved within N(N + 1) steps. Observe that when selecting the registration scheme, SUs of higher types have higher utility. When more SUs choosing the registration scheme, the utility of SUs of lower types becomes non-positive sooner. We can then design a distributed algorithm for SUs to achieve an NE without any improvement steps. The key idea is to allow the SUs to choose the registration scheme in a descending order of their types until no more SUs have incentives to join. The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 4. Under complete information, Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to achieve an NE of NDRG. Its time complexity is O(N).
Proof: Please refer to [19] . Each SU can independently implement Algorithm 1 by acquiring the number of currently registered SUs. Note that the converged NE is not unique if there are multiple SUs with the same type θ i M . Due to the NE output proved in Theorem 4, no SU has the incentive to deviate unilaterally from the algorithm. 
R 0 is the total number of SUs with type larger than θ i M . R 1 is the number of registered SUs of type θ i M .
Together with Eqn. (4), we can rewrite U DO in (1) as:
Here U DO also has a linear relationship for all {q i }, ∀i < i M , we have:
The optimization problem for the DO becomes
subject to:
Similarly, we restrict the range of r to be [r ,r] and use a twodimensional exhaustive search to find the solution. We provide the numerical results in Section VII.
VI. Pricing Solution for Strategic SUs in Incomplete Information Scenario
In this section, we study the pricing problem under incomplete information for strategic SUs. Due to hidden information, at stage II, the DO cannot design query plans for each SU to extract all their revenue. Instead, the DO should offer a set of contract items for each type of SUs to choose from. Since SUs can obtain non-negative utility choosing the service plan scheme, the analysis of the NDRG will be much more complicated.
A. Stage II: Contract Design under Incomplete Information
In the incomplete information scenario, to ensure SUs of type θ i have the incentive to select query plan (q i , p i ), another set of constraints called Incentive Compatibility (IC) should be satisfied:
The physical meaning of IC is that an SU with type θ i achieves the maximum utility when choosing the corresponding contract item (q i , p i ). Note that there are a total of N(N − 1) IC constraints.
To analyze the design of optimal contract items, we first relax the condition to allow q i s to be any real number in the range [0, M]. With the relaxed q i s, the optimal contract design problem satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees Single-crossing Condition (SMC) [6] . We have the following lemma.
Lemma 5. When q i s are real numbers, we can express the query plans as
Proof: Please refer to [19] . Substituting (13) and N i = μ 1 · β i into (1) and putting the terms related to the same query variable together, the optimal contract design problem for DO can then be expressed as
where
Algorithm 2 Finding Valid Query Sequence.
1: i S (μ 1 ) = T ; 2: while g i S (μ 1 ) (μ 1 ) > 0 do 3: i S (μ 1 ) = i S (μ 1 ) − 1; 4: end while 5:q i (μ 1 ) = 0, ∀i ≤ i S (μ 1 );q i (μ 1 ) = M, ∀i > i S (μ 1 ); Now, we consider q i s to be integers. Since factor g i q i only relates to q i given μ 1 , we can then find the optimal value for each q i independently. We useq i (μ 1 ) to denote argmax 0≤q i ≤M g i q i . The set of {q i (μ 1 )} can be achieved at the boundary points (0 or M). However,q i may not be monotonically nondecreasing on i (requirement of Eqn. (13)). We design Algorithm 2 to obtain valid {q i }. Note that q i s obtained in Algorithm 2 can be 0 or M, which is the same as that when q i s are real numbers. Therefore, it is valid for us to replace the IC constraints with Eqn. (13) .
Suppose the valid queries obtained areq i for type θ i SUs, the optimal query plans at stage II are
) Note that Algorithm 2 finds a suboptimal sequence of valid {q i }. Because Algorithm 2 has restricted the range of {q i } to be only boundary points. One way to obtain optimal {q i } is the brunching and ironing algorithm [6] [19] . However, the optimal algorithm is of high complexity and cannot guarantee the existence of an NE in the NDRG at stage I. It is difficult to prove theoretical the gap between the optimal and suboptimal solution in this paper, we will evaluate the price of the suboptimal {q i } in Section VII.
B. Stage I: Database Registration Game of SUs
We now consider the NDRG between SUs under incomplete information scenario.
1) Existence of an NE: At stage II, Algorithm 2 is published by the DO to the SUs. Assuming the type of u i is θ σ(i) , the utility of u i when choosing the service plan scheme can be computed as: U i = θ σ(i) v(q σ(i) (μ 1 )) −p σ(i) (μ 1 ). Note that μ 1 is the number of SUs choosing the service plan scheme. We can therefore rewrite the utility of u i considering the two possible strategies as
From the utility function of u i , we can verify that NDRG under incomplete information is also an unweighted congestion game when using Algorithm 2 to obtain {q i }. As a result, we can also find an NE with an improvement path with a finite number of improvement steps. According to Lemma 3, we have:
Theorem 6. Under incomplete information, NDRG has a pure strategy NE which can be achieved with an improvement path of at most N(N + 1) steps starting from any strategy-tuple.
Algorithm 3 Distributed Database Registration Algorithm under Incomplete Information.
1: SUs randomly select one pricing scheme and record in the database; 2: DO assigns each SU a unique ID in the range [0, N − 1]; 3: Time duration counter t = 0; 4: while a is not an NE do 5: Active SU ID in t is i = t mod N; 6: if U i (a i , μ a i ) < U i (1 − a i , μ 1−a i + 1) then 7: Update strategy from a i to 1 − a i within t; 8: end if 9: t = t + 1; 10: end while 2) Distributed Database Registration Algorithm: In the case of incomplete information, some SUs of higher types are guaranteed with non-negative payoff with the service plan scheme. These SUs may prefer the service plan scheme.
Unlike the complete information case, the SUs now have to make the pricing scheme choice repeatedly. The SUs can act according to Algorithm 3 to achieve an NE in a distributed manner via repeated improvements. Algorithm 3 is based on the improvement path. Since all the SUs are connected with the database, we assume at stage I, the SUs are synchronized with the database. Also, we assume there are predefined time slots. SUs can determine whether to change their strategies within a time slot one by one according to the order of their assigned IDs. In each time slot, only one SU may update his strategy to optimize its own utility given the new situation of other SUs' choices. It is easy to see that in Algorithm 3, every update is a step in the improvement path. Therefore, Algorithm 3 is guaranteed to find an NE within N(N + 1) updates. Note that the found NE by the algorithm is also not unique if there are many SUs with the same type.
C. Stage I: Optimal Parameter Selection of DO 1) Estimate the SUs' choices in an NE:
Estimating μ 0 and μ 1 is essential for the DO to optimize its pricing parameters. However, due to the randomness of the SUs' strategies the NE found by Algorithm 3 is not unique. Therefore, it is impossible to get an accurate estimation. We assume the DO uses the expected value as an estimation of μ 0 and μ 1 . However, to calculate the expectation, the DO needs to generate all possible strategy-tuples (2 N ) and check all possible NEs, which is computationally infeasible. However, by exploring the nature of SUs in our scenario, we are able to dramatically reduce the computation complexity of the DO. Proof: Please refer to [19] . Lemma 7 says all SUs with the same type other than the type θ i S have the same strategies inā. As a result, the DO can use Algorithm 4 to estimate the number of μ 0 and μ 1 [19] . In the algorithm, the DO only needs to check no more than 2 T · N different strategy-tuples which is linear with N. for Counter=1 to 2 T do 4: a −i = the bits in Counter's binary representation; 5: Assign strategy of SUs with type θ θ i with a −i ; 6: for j = 0 to N · β i do 7:
Let j of the type θ i SUs choose 0; 8: Let N · β i − j of the type θ i SUs choose 1; 9: if It is an NE then R ALL = R ALL {current μ 0 }; 10: end for 11: end for 12: end for 13: μ 0 = the most common value in the multi-set R ALL ; 14: μ 1 = N − μ 0 ; 2) Optimization Parameter Selection: Utilizing the estimation of μ 0 and μ 1 obtained from Algorithm 4, the DO now needs to solve the following optimization problem:
Note thatq i is a function of B R , r. Again, the problem can be solved using two-dimensional exhaustive search to find the solution when we restrict the range of r to be [r ,r]. We provide numerical results in Section VII.
VII. Numerical Results
In this section, we use numerical results to evaluate the proposed hybrid pricing scheme. We first introduce the simulation setup and then discuss the results.
A. Simulation Setup
We assume there are a total of N = 100 − 1000 SUs in the network. The default value of N is 100. There are M = 100 periods. The expected available TVWS is B = 60 MHz [9] We assume there are T = 5−30 types, with 10 as the default value. For T = 10, we generate 5 different possible type distributions summarized in table II. For all T = 5 − 30, we also have a random type distribution where the number of SUs in each type is randomly generated.
When applying a two-dimensional search, we need to fix the range of r. When B R = 60, μ 0 = 1, the highest revenue a SU can obtain is B R /μ 0 × θ 10 = 600. So r should be within [0, 600]. We assume the smallest change in r is r 0 = 1 unit. We Fig. 1 : Impact of SU strategy on bandwidth reservation. assume the total TV bandwidth can only be allocated in the unit of b 0 = 6 MHz. For the database maintenance cost we set α = 1.2 in φ 0 (b) = 0 · b α and we vary the parameter 0 in the range [0, 7]. If 0 is too high, DO will not have the incentive to consider the registration scheme. We set the default value of 1 to be 0. In the case of non-strategic SUs, we assume γ i s are the same among all types. We use a single value γ to denote the fraction of SUs preferring the registration scheme. We will set γ to be either 0.2 or 0.5.
In this section, for convenience we refer to the Complete Information Scenario as CIS and the Incomplete Information Scenario as IIS.
B. Simulation Results
1) Impact of SU strategy: In this section, we compare the two cases: non-strategic SUs in CIS and strategic SUs in CIS to show the impact of SU strategy on the pricing solution.
First, in Fig. 1 , we assume Distr. 1. We set 1 to be either 0.05 or 0.1. We then vary 0 and plot the optimal B R obtained from three cases: non-strategic SUs with γ = 0.2, non-strategic SUs with γ = 0.5 and strategic SUs, all under CIS. From Fig. 1 , we can see that with non-strategic SUs, the DO tends to reserve less bandwidth for the reservation scheme under the same 0 and 1 . That is because when the SUs are nonstrategic players, they decide whether to pay the registration fee only based on the prior knowledge of the number of SUs in the registration scheme which is predetermined. Therefore, many SUs will overestimate the registration fee, so that the DO cannot increase the registration fee to obtain higher profit.
Second, in Fig. 2 , we fixed the SU type distribution to be Distr. 1 and set 1 = 0.05. We vary 0 and plot the utility of DO and the average utility of SUs given the optimal pricing parameters. From Fig. 2a , we can see that in both scenarios, the DO utility first decreases and then remains the same after B R = 0. When 0 is higher, the DO utility in the non-strategic scenario is higher compared with that in the strategic SU scenario. That's because when 0 is higher, in the strategic scenario, the profit DO makes from the registered SUs become smaller. However, most of DO profit in the non-strategic SU scenario comes from the non-registered SUs. We can also see from strategic SU scenario, some SUs can choose the registered scheme to obtain non-zero utility. From the comparison, we can conclude that with more intelligent SU strategy, SUs achieve higher average utility.
2) Benefit of Hybrid Pricing Scheme: We compared the DO's revenue when applying hybrid and uniform pricing schemes. There are two uniform pricing schemes: registration only or service plan only. We set epsilon 0 = 3.0. In the case of registration scheme only, B R = 60 while in the case of service plan scheme only, B R = 0. We show the maximum possible revenues the DO can obtain in Fig. 3 . We can see that the hybrid pricing scheme provides higher revenue for the DO.
3) Impact of the bandwidth reservation cost: To show the impact of the bandwidth reservation cost on the optimal bandwidth reservation B R , we vary 0 from 0 to 5.2 and plot the optimal B R under each 0 in both CIS and IIS in Fig.  4a and Fig. 4b , respectively. In both scenarios, B R decreases with the increase of 0 . That is because with greater 0 , the reservation cost for the same bandwidth is higher, so the DO prefers to allocate more bandwidth for unregistered users. We can see that when 0 ≥ 5.2, B R = 0 for all cases, which means no bandwidth is reserved for the registration scheme.
We can also observe from Fig. 4 that in Distr. 2 B R decreases the fastest among the three distributions. That is because in Distr. 2, there are more SUs of higher types, who are more likely to have g i > 0 in Eqn. (16) , thus DO can benefit more from the service plan scheme.
It is also worth noting that in the CIS, B R decreases to zero sooner compared with that in the IIS. That is because in CIS, DO can design the query plans for individual unregistered SUs to make more profit. 4) Impact of the DO's knowledge of SUs' personal information: In Fig. 5 , we show the impact of the DO's knowledge of the SUs' personal information on the utility of the DO and the SUs. The SUs' types are set to distribution 1.
We can see from Fig. 5a that the DO has higher utility in the CIS than that in the IIS, when 0 ≥ 1.7. That is because when 0 ≥ 1.7, B R < 60 in CIS. As a result, the bandwidth for the service plan scheme is non-zero and the DO can make more revenue from unregistered SUs in the CIS.
We can see from Fig. 5b that the SUs have higher average utility in the IIS than that in CIS, when 0 > 2.7. That' because when 0 > 2.7, B R < 60 in IIS. As a result, the bandwidth for the service plan scheme is non-zero and the SUs can get nonnegative utility when choosing the service plan scheme.
We can also notice that when 0 < 1.7 in Fig. 5a and when 0 < 2.7 in Fig. 5b , B R = 60, which means all bandwidth is reserved for registered SUs. As the DO design registration scheme to admit only registered SUs with the highest type, the utilities obtain in both information scenario are the same.
In summary, with more knowledge of the SUs' information, the DO enjoys higher utility. On the other hand, the hidden information provides the SUs higher utility. 5) Impact of the SUs' type distribution: To show the impact of the SUs' type distribution on the contract design, we fixed B R = 30, r = 200, 0 = 3.0 and compute the q i and p i in the service plans for 50 unregistered SUs in the 5 different SU type distributions. Note that the parameters may not be the optimal pricing parameters for each distribution, the use of the same parameters for all the distributions allows us to see the impact of SU type distribution separately. Fig. 6 shows the results for q i and p i . In Fig. 6a , we can see that when the number of SUs of lower types is higher, (compared distr. 3 and distr. 1), DO tends to assign non-zero queries for lower type SUs. That is because a query q i is determined by a factor of T j=i+1 Nβ j in Eqn. (16) . In Fig. 6b we can see that if nonzero q i is assigned to a lower type, a lower price p i should be charged. This is because, the price should follow the individual rationality constraint (Eqn. (4)) for such SUs.
6) Impact of the suboptimal query assignment: We implemented the brunching and ironing algorithm [6] for the contract design. We assume at stage I, the DO and the SUs still use Algorithm 2 to estimate the contracts to ensure the existence of an NE. We generate random SU type distributions with N = 100, T = 5 − 30 and set B R = 0, which indicates that all the N SUs choose the service plan scheme. We repeated the test for 100 times. We show the average utility of the DO obtained from query assignment algorithms in Fig. 7 . For a different T , Algorithm 2 achieves the DO utility within 90% of that obtained from the optimal algorithm. 7) Convergence time to an NE under incomplete information scenario: To check the convergence time to NE via Algorithm 3, we fix B R = 30, r = 200 and generate N = 100 − 1000 SUs with uniformly distributed types. Under each N, we repeat Algorithm 3 200 times. Fig. 8 shows the average steps of improvement needed to achieve an NE. It is clear that the number of steps is bounded by N · (N + 1), which verifies Theorem 6. We may prove a tighter bound for the convergence time in our future work.
VIII. Discussion and Future Works
In this paper, to make the problem solvable, we have made several simplifications in the system model. There are several interesting ways to further extend this work. First, the registration scheme considered in this paper admits a uniform registration fee. In a more flexible setting, the registered SUs can pay different amounts of registration fees and enjoy different shares of the reserved bandwidth. Second, the pricing framework considered in this paper is not dynamic. In a more dynamic setting, the DO can redesign new pricing parameters for the following time durations and the SUs can also reselect the pricing scheme given the observation in previous time durations and the newly announced pricing parameter. 
IX. Related Works
Most existing works on geo-location databases can be classified into two categories. Some works focus on the design of geo-location database to protect primary users. In [10] , Gurney et al. discussed the methods to calculate the protection area for TV stations. Some other works focused on the networking issue with the assumption that the database is already set up. In [5] , Feng et al. presented a white space system utilizing a database. In [11] , Chen et al. considered the channel selection and access point association problem. In one recent work [12] , the authors proposed that the geo-location database acts as a spectrum broker reserving the spectrum from spectrum licensees. They considered only one pricing scheme which is similar to the registration scheme discussed in this paper.
Many works also focus on the economic issue of dynamic spectrum sharing. In [14] , the pricing-based spectrum access control is investigated under secondary users competitions. In [15] , spectrum pricing with spatial reuse is considered. Contract theory is utilized in the scenarios where the spectrum buyers have hidden information. In [13] , Gao et al. leveraged contract theory to analyze the spectrum trading between primary operator and SUs. In [16] , contract theory is applied to the cooperative communication scenario. In this paper, we also model the service plan design with contract theory. However, due to the co-existence of hybrid pricing schemes, there is uncertainty about the number of SUs choosing the contract items, which is different from existing works.
There are some works focus on the hybrid pricing of other limited resources. In [17] . Wang et al. study the problem of capacity segmentation for two different pricing schemes for cloud service providers. One key difference between our work and [17] is that the strategic SUs considered in our paper can dynamically choose between pricing schemes.
X. Conclusions
In this paper, we consider a hybrid pricing model for TVWS database. The SUs can choose between the registration and the service plan scheme. We investigate scenarios where the SUs can be either non-strategic or strategic players and the DO has either complete and incomplete information of the SUs. In the non-strategic SU scenario, we model the competitions among the SUs as non-cooperative game and prove the existence of an NE in two different scenarios by showing that the game is an unweighted congestion game. We model the pricing for unregistered SUs with contract theory and derive suboptimal query plans for different types of SUs. Based on the SUs' pricing scheme choices, the DO optimally determines the bandwidth segmentation and pricing parameters to maximize its profit. We have conducted extensive simulations to obtain numerical results and verify our theoretical claims.
